The Practice of Taxes as the Practice of Law: The Lawyer-Accountant Dispute by Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1955
The Practice of Taxes as the Practice of Law: The
Lawyer-Accountant Dispute
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "The Practice of Taxes as the Practice of Law: The Lawyer-Accountant Dispute" (1955). Minnesota Law
Review. 2723.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2723
THE PRACTICE OF TAXES AS THE PRACTICE OF LAW:
THE LAWYER-ACCOUNTANT DISPUTE
INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code, the regulations issued under it,
and the case law interpreting it comprise a complicated and techni-
cal branch of the law.' There can be no dispute about that. Yet, it is
a peculiar type of law in that it is an embodiment of technical con-
cepts developed by another profession, accounting. Thus we have
a system in which one technical field is superimposed on another.2
It is only natural that the practitioners in both fields would claim
competence to practice in the common field. In recent years, largely
as a result of a number of decisions unfavorable to the accountant, a
serious dispute has arisen between the accounting and legal pro-
fessions as to which activities in the field of federal taxation the
members of each profession may properly perform.3
The lawyers charge that many of the functions accountants com-
monly perform constitute the practice of law. The motivation for
the charge is not a desire to exclude the accountant from a lucrative
practice4 but rather its justification lies in a belief that the best
interest of the public requires that accountants be prohibited from
performing these functions.5 The accountants do not claim to be
competent to practice law6 nor do they deny that the best interest
of the public should be determined of which functions either group
should perform.7 Their contention is that the determination of in-
1. Rembar, The Practice of Taxes, 54 Col. L. Rev. 338, 340 (1954).
2. Austin, Relations Between Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants
in Income Tax Practice, 36 Iowa L. Rev. 227, 229 (1950) ; Rembar, supra
note 1, at 340.
3. Editorial, CPAs' Tax Practice Seriously Threatened, 98 J. Account-
ancy 161 (1954) ; Editorial, Federal Control of Federal Tax Practice, 98 J.
Accountancy 161 (1954) ; A Word About Our Leading Article, 20 Unauth.
Prac. News, No. 3, 3-5 (Oct. 1954) ; Tax Law Practice, 23 U. S. L. Week
2100 (Aug. 24, 1954).
4. See Statement of the American Bar Association Regarding Proposed
Revision of Treasury Department Circular No. 230, 40 A. B. A. J. i, ii (Nov.
1954). An editorial in the official publication of the AIA has intimated as
much. See Editorial, CPAs' Tax Practice Seriousy Theatened, 98 J. Account-
ancy 161 (1954).
5. See Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 180, 52 N. E. 2d 27,
31 (1943) ; Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 477, 48 N. W. 2d 788, 794
(1951) ; People v. Alfani, 227 N. Y. 334, 339, 125 N. E. 671, 673 (1919);
Otterbourg, A Study of Unauthorized Practice of Law 2-4 (1951).
6. See Statement of Principles Relating to Practice in the Field of
Federal Income Taxation Promulgated by the National Conference of Lawyers
and Certified Public Accountants, 91 J. Accountancy 869 (1951).
7. Carey, Ethics, "Unauthorized Practice," and Federal Income Taxa-
tion-An Accountant's Viewpoint, 25 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 435, 436 (1953);
Correa, Recent Developments in Federal Income Tax Practice, 98 J. Ac-
countancy 599, 607 (1954) ; Editorial, Helping the Taxpayer, 98 J. Account-
ancy 610, 617 (1954).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
come, whether it be for the purpose of preparing a financial state-
ment or an income tax return is essentially an accounting function. s
They admit that often the tax law does not conform to accepted ac-
counting principles," but they contend that the matrix of tax law is
accounting and should be handled by accountants. 10
The courts have had difficulty formulating a workable definition
of what constitutes the practice of law."- However, they do agree
that the reason for restricting the practice of law to lawyers is that
in legal matters the public needs to be protected from the incom-
petent and unprincipled.' 2 The problem is to determine in which
areas of tax practice the public needs to be protected.
PREPARATION OF TAx RETURNS
The majority of courts'3 as well as the ABA'" agree that it is
proper for the account to prepare tax returns. However, there is a
dispute as to the type of problems the accountant may handle inci-
dental to the preparation of a return. Three tests have been de-
veloped which can be described as: (1) The wholly within the field
of law test ;15 (2) The incidental test ;16 (3) The difficult or doubtful
question of law test.17
In the wholly within the field of law test, the line is drawn at
the point where the services of a lawyer become absolutely essen-
tial.' The advocates of the test argue that the dictates of reality
require that lawyers recognize that there are vast areas of the law
8. Id. at 611.
9. Brief for the AIA as Amicus Curiae, p. 9, Gardner v. Conway, 234
Minn. 468, 48 N. W. 2d 788 (1951).
10. Richardson, The Accountant's Position in the Field of Taxation,
98 J. Accountancy 166, 171-172 (1954).
11. See In re Shoe Mfr's Protective Ass'n, Inc., 295 Mass. 369, 372, 3
N. E. 2d 746, 748 (1936) ; see Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 613, 194
N. E. 313, 317 (1935).
12. See note 5 supra.
13. Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d 807, 273 P. 2d 619 (Super. Ct.
1954) ; see Merrick v. American Security & Trust Co., 107 F. 2d 271, 278(D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 625 (1940) ; Gardner v. Conway, 234
Minn. 468, 482-483, 48 N. W. 2d 783, 796 (1951) ; Application of New York
County Lawyers Ass'n Bercu), 273 App. Div. 524, 537, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 209,
220 (1st Dep't 1948), aff d mere., 299 N. Y. 728, 87 N. E. 2d 451 (1949).
14. See Report of the Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of
the Law, 76 A. B. A. Rep. 280, 283-284 (1951).
15. See Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 183, 52 N. E. 2d 27,
32 (1943).
16. See Application of New York Country Lawyers Ass'n (Bercu), 273
App. Div. 524, 537, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 209, 220 (1st Dep't 1948), aff'd mcm.,
299 N. Y. 728, 87 N. E. 2d 451 (1949) ; 33 Minn. L. Rev. 445 (1949).
17. See Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 480-481, 48 N. W. 2d 788,
796 (1951).
18. See Ashley, The Unauthorized Practice of Law, 16 A. B. A. J. 558
(1930) (Argument that the law of unauthorized practice should be formu-
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in which laymen are competent to give advice and that any attempt
to prevent them from doing so will be futile.1 9
The incidental test was laid down in Matter of New York
County Lawyers Ass'n (Bercu), a New York case.20 The court
held that a CPA engages in the practice of law when on a purely
consultant basis independent of any accounting function, he under-
takes extensive research on a tax problem and subsequently gives
advice based on his research. However, the court went beyond the
facts of the case to lay down the proposition that an accountant
may properly decide legal questions when they arise incidental to
the preparation of a return.2 1 The court reasoned that as a matter
of accommodation to the businessman the accountant should be
allowed to decide questions of law that arise incidental to the
preparation of a return, but that it is quite another matter to allow
an accountant as an independent consultant to advise upon questions
of tax law.
22
The difficult or doubtful question of law test was laid down in
Gardner v. Conway, a Minnesota decision.23 The court specifically
rejected the incidental test24 and held that the giving of legal advice
by a layman even though it be incidental to his preparation of a tax
return constitutes the practice of law if a difficult or doubtful ques-
tion of law is involved. TL court explicitly stated that the criterion
as to what constitutes a difficult or doubtful question is the under-
standing of a reasonably intelligent layman who is reasonably
familiar with similar transactions.25 The court recognized that the
test could be criticized for uncertainty but was of the opinion that
any rule as to what does or does not constitute the practice of law
should be flexible enough to reflect the variables in particular cases.21
The incidental test has the merit of simplicity and certainty and
in its negative application is probably sound. That is, if the account-
ant preparing the return feels that he cannot handle the matter, then,
in all probability, the question is of such a nature that a lawyer
should be consulted. But when applied in a positive manner it
lated in terms of matters properly legal which non-lawyers are competent to
perform and matters which are exclusively legal which only the lawyer
should handle).
19. Id. at 559; Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices and Cures?,
5 Law & Contemp. Prob. 104, 112-113 (1938).
20. 273 App. Div. 524, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 209 (1st Dep't 1948), aff'd inee.,
299 N. Y. 728, 87 N. E. 2d 451 (1949).
21. Id. at 537, 78 N. Y. S. 2d at 220.
22. Ibid.
23. 234 Minn. 468,48 N. W. 2d 788 (1951).
24. Id. at 479, 48 N. W. 2d at 795.
25. Id. at 481, 48 N. W. 2d at.796.
26. Id. at 481, 48 N. W. 2d at 796-797.
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leaves much to be desired. The dichotomy it sets up is illogical and
bears little relations to the objective of protecting the public. If a
particular question is one that ought to be handled by a lawyer,
then the mere fact that it arsises incidental to the preparation of a
return does not make the accountant competent to handle it. True, it
may be convenient and less expensive for the taxpayer to have an
accountant prepare his return, but this is the type of situation against
which the rules of unauthorized practice of law are designed to
guard. A person who is unfamiliar with the law is not capable of
evaluating the caliber of services he receives, and therefore is not in
a position to make an intelligent decision as to whether an account-
ant or an attorney would best serve his needs.2 7
In effect the difficult or doubtful question of law test and the
wholly within the field of law test are the same. Both recognize that
there are some legal questions that can quite properly be answered
by a layman, and presumably any determination of what is wholly
within the field of law would be made in terms of how difficult or
doubtful the question is. While the difficult or doubtful test suffers
from indefiniteness, it is to be preferred over the incidental test
in that it is designed to require a decision on the ultimate question
of the point at which the best interest of the public requires that the
services of a lawyer be obtained. However, in the Conway case the
court made no definite statement as to: (1) whether the CPA
should be treated as all other laymen; (2) whether for purposes of
the test it would be permissible to defferentiate between pure ques-
tions of tax law and questions oi general law arising in a tax setting.
The court formulated the test in terms of the understanding
of a reasonably intelligent layman who is reasonably familiar with
similar transactions. While the court did not explain what it meant
by a layman reasonably familiar with similar transactions, the fact
that it used such language shows that it did not contemplate that
the understanding of mere reasonably intelligent laymen should
be the basis of the test. However, since the court talked in terms
of accountants and other laymen,28 it can be inferred that it did
contemplate a division between lawyers and all others. This is the
interpretation that the certified public accountants have made of the
Conway case and it is the basis of their disapproval of the case. They
feel that the CPA should not be placed on the same level as the
self styled tax expert.29 This position is deserving of analysis.
27. Rembar, supra note 1, at 339.
28. Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 46.8, 482, 48 N. W. 2d 788, 797 (1951).
29. See Correa, supra note 7, at 600.
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To be justified, any difference in treatment must be founded on
a showing that to become a CPA an individual must demonstrate a
level of attainment in legal matters which is higher than that
possessed by a reasonable intelligent layman who is reasonably
familiar with similar transactions. To become a CPA one must pass
an examination which is given on a nation wide basis. 80 The exami-
nation contains questions on commercial and tax law.3'1 However,
the questions test knowledge of particular laws and rules rather
than the ability to analyze and interpret cases and complex statu-
tory material. 32 To the extent that the court's reasonably intelligent
laymen is not familiar with the general principals of commerce and
income tax law, status as a CPA would justify a difference in treat-
ment when problems requiring knowledge of this type are involved.
Since the court's reasonably intelligent layman is one that is reason-
ably familiar with similar transactions, it is doubtful that there is
a substantial disparity of knowledge between the two groups on
matters of this type. Even assuming that there is, it is doubtful that
the court would on that fact alone be willing to open up a wider
area of tax practice for the CPA. For one of the lawyer's arguments
against allowing the layman to handle difficult or doubtful questions
of law is that they are not trained in the analysis and interpretation
of case law. The fact that the CPA has demonstrated competence
in what might be termed "hornbook law" does not mean that he is
qualified to delve into complex statutes and conflicting case law.
From the certified public accountant's viewpoint as well as that
of accountants generally, the better approach to the difficult or doubt-
ful question of law test would be to argue that it should not be
applied in the same manner in all areas of tax practice, but rather
that in applying it the courts should consider whether the particular
question involves: (1) accounting concepts, such as depreciation;
(2) a problem of general law in a tax setting, such as whether a
trust has been established; (3) a problem peculiar to tax law but
having no foundation in accounting concepts such as one involving
carryover and carryback of net operating losses.
Obviously, the strongest case for relaxing the standards would
30. Carey, supra note 7, at 447.
31. Examples are found in Coppola and Katz, Law Review for C.P.A.
Examinations 256, 281 (1948).
32. For example, "If an offer is made by mail, when is the offer com-
pleted? If an acceptance is to be made by mail, when is the acceptance com-
pleted? May either the offer or the acceptance be withdrawn? Explain." Id.
at 3. "A corporation takes out an insurance policy on the life of its president,
naming itself as beneficiary. What would you advise the controller in answer
to his question as to whether or not the premium on the policy is deductible for
purposes of United States Income Tax?" Id. at 260.
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occur where the question involves accounting concepts. Accountants
can argue that, while to a large extent accounting for income tax
purposes is prescribed by statute, the statutes are formulated in
terms of concepts developed by accountants and that these concepts
are rather intricate and complex. As a consequence, say the account-
ants, only those that are trained in accounting and understand its
philosophy are competent to determine how a particular trans-
action should be handled, 3  and to argue in support of their deter-
mination. They can point to the fact that it has only been in recent
years that law schools have offered courses in federal income taxa-
tion34 and that in relatively few states is it a required subject on the
bar examination.
3 5
The lawyers can argue that if the rules prohibiting the unauthor-
ized practice of law were relaxed in favor of groups with special
qualifications in a particular area of the law, the same would have
to be done in other areas of the law and that soon there would be
nothing left for the lawyer. As applied to real estate agents or
collection agencies, this proposition is probably sound, but it is of
doubtful validity when the subject matter being dealt with apart
from the law is in itself technical in nature. The lawyer can also
argue that the public is better protected when a lawyer is handling
its affairs, in that he is sworn to adhere to a stringent code of ethics
and is amenable to the supervision of the courts.36 There are areas
in federal tax practice in which problems of an ethical nature may
arise, the problem of advertising being one of the more serious.
Problems of conflicting interest also may arise such as in advising
both a corporation and one of its officers on their tax matters. But
the certified public accountant can claim that this line of argument
does not apply to him as he too is subject to a code of ethics.37 The
lawyer's strongest argument is that tax law does not in fact comply
with accepted accounting principle but rather that accounting for
tax purposes is largely prescribed by statute, regulations, and case
law, s and that the analysis of material of this type is exclusively
within the lawyer's province. To this the accountants can counter
with their argument that whether prescribed by statute or not
33. See Brief for the AIA as Amicus Curiae, p. 8, Gardner v. Conway,
234 Minn. 468, 48 N. W. 2d 788 (1951).
34. Austin, upra note 2, at 230.
35. Rembar, supra note 1, at 352 n. 29.
36. For that argument see Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 478, 48
N. W. 2d 788, 795 (1951).
37. Carey, supra note 7, at 448-449.
38. See Otterbourg, Co-Operation Between Lawyers and Accountants
i; Tax Practice, 17 Unauth. Prac. News No. 4, 3, at 9 (1951).
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accounting for tax purposes is still accounting, and only those who
understand the underlying concepts of accounting are competent to
handle such problems.
Does the solution lie in determining whether it is easier for the
accountant to learn legal method or for the lawyer to learn account-
ing? Of course not, for there is no way of ascertaining whether the
individual has in fact acquired skill in the other profession. In
problems of the type involving accounting concepts but requiring
an analysis of case law for their solution, it can be said with some
degree of certainty that the lawyer who specializes in tax matters
will be better equipped to handle the problem than the CPA. On the
other hand, an argument can be made that there are some certified
public accountants who come into contact with tax matters on a day
by day basis and thereby develop a "feeling" for problems of this
type and consequently are better equipped to handle them than a
general legal practitioner who is familiar with neither accounting
nor tax law. This approach is of little assistance. To be workable
any regulation has to be in terms of a class who have met minimum
requirements. 9 Under existing regulations there is no way of
determining which certified public accountants are competent to
handle problems of this type or which lawyers are not competent to
handle them.4 0 Under these circumstances the only safe result is to
require that both the accountant and the lawyer handle the problem.
This is exactly what the difficult or doubtful question of law test
requires.
The accountant's position is much weaker when the question
involved is one peculiar to tax law but not dependent upon account-
ing concepts. The accountant can no longer claim that the technical
nature of the problem is such that only the accountant may handle it.
He is reduced to arguing that the taxpayer's convenience and the
fact that he in his work as an accountant frequently comes into con-
tact with similar problems should entitle him to handle the problem.
This should not justify his handling of problems involving the inter-
pretation and evaluation of case law.
When the question is one of general law, the accountant loses his
argument of familiarity with the problem. Perhaps in this area
some arbitrary rule would be proper. For example, the handling
of a problem involving questions of general law by an accountant
might prima facie be deemed to constitute the practice of law.
39. See Note, Attorney Versus Accountant: A Professional Jurisdic-
tional Dispute in the Field of Income Tax Practice, 56 Yale L. J. 1438, 1443
n. 21 (1947).
40. See Carey, supra note 7, at 449-450; Rembar, supra note 9, at 167;
Richardson, supra note 9, at 167.
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TAX PLANNING
The Bercu case, 41 in which the incidental test was formulated, is
the only holding found on the question of what problems the account-
ant can properly handle in the tax planning area. A literal applica-
tion of the incidental test would prohibit accountants from giving
any tax advice, independent of the preparation of a return. The re-
sult would be the same regardless of whether the advice was given
by the accountant who normally prepared the taxpayer's return
or one that was called in on a purely consultant basis. When the
taxpayer's regular accountant is involved, which was not the case in
Bercu, it is extremely unlikely that a court would allow him to
handle a particular problem in connection with the preparation of a
return but not independent of the preparation of a return. Such
a result would have no relation to the protection of the public.42 In-
come tax problems arise on a day to day basis, not just when the
yearly return has to be prepared. When a taxpayer is contemplating
the feasibility of a particular transaction, he needs to know the tax
consequences of it at that time. It would be sheer economic waste to
require him in all instances to consult a lawyer. While the Conway
case involved the preparation of a return, there is no reason why
it should not be applied in the tax planning area as well. Under its
difficult or doubtful question of law test the interest of the public
would be considered.
When the accountant involved is called in on a purely consultant
basis independent of an accounting function there is something to be
said for preventing him from giving tax advice. The argument of
convenience to the taxpayer is gone 43 and the mere fact that outside
advice is sought indicates that the problem is of such a nature that
it could be handled better by the combined efforts of the taxpayer's
regular accountant and a lawyer. In addition there is danger that a
person who' is retained on a purely consultant basis will hesitat6 to
admit that the services of a lawyer are needed.
PRACTICE BEFORE THE TREAsURY DEPART.AENT
Present Regulations
Under the present regulations the attorney and the CPA are
admitted to practice before the Treasury Department by mere proof
41. Application of New York County Lawyers Ass'n (Bercu), 273
App. Div. 524, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 209, 221 (lst Dep't 1948), aff'd mem., 299 N. Y.
728, 87 N. E. 2d 451 (1949).
42. See Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 479, 48 N. W. 2d 788, 795
(1951).
43. See Application of New York County Lawyers Ass'n (Bercu), 273
App. Div. 524, 538, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 209, 221 (lst Dep't 1948), aff'd mcm.,
299 N. Y. 728, 87 N. E. 2d 451 (1949).
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of their status in good standing44 as such. Others may be admitted by
submitting proof of good moral character and the taking and passing
of a written examination.45 The lawyer is designated as an en-
rolled attorney while the certified public accountant is designated
an enrolled agent.40 Attorneys are required to observe the canons
of ethics of the ABA and enrolled agents, the ethical standards of
the accounting profession.4 7
The present regulations governing the rules of practice before
the Treasury Department provide that:
"Practice before the Treasury Department shall be deemed to
comprehend all matters connected with the presentation of a
client's interests . . . ,including the preparation ... of necessary
written documents.... ,,4s
"An agent enrolled before the Treasury Department shall have
the same rights, powers, and privileges and be subject to the
same duties as an enrolled attorney: Provided, That an enrolled
agent shall not have the privilege of drafting or preparing any
written instrument by which title to real or personal property
may be conveyed or transferred for the purpose of affecting
Federal taxes, nor shall such enrolled agent advise a client as
to the legal sufficiency of such an instrument or its legal effect
upon the Federal taxes of such client: And provided further,
That nothing in the regulations in this part shall be construed
as authorizing persons not members of the bar to practice law."
'4 a
The dispute centers around the meaning of the "provided further"
clause. The accountants, and others, contend that the clause does
not refer to practice before the Treasury Department but rather
that it was intended to make it clear that authority to practice before
the treasury does not constitute authorization to engage in the
general practice of law."' They argue that the provision of the regu-
lation to the effect that practice before the treasury will "be deemed
to comprehend all matters connected with the client's interest"
means what it says and that accountants who are admitted to
practice are authorized to perform "all matters" regardless of
whether a state court would designate a particular matter as the
practice of law.5' They argue that it would be nonsensical to make
such a broad grant and then cut it down by way of a provision in a
44. 31 Code Fed. Regs. § 10.3(a) (1) (i), (ii) (1949).
45. 31 Code Fed. Regs. § 10.3(j) (1949).
46. 31 Code Fed. Regs. § 10.3(a) (1) (1949).
47. 31 Code Fed. Regs. § 10.2(z) (1949).
48. 31 Code Fed. Regs. § 10.2(b) (1949).
49. 31 Code Fed. Regs. § 10.2(f) (1949).
50. See Rembar, supra note 1, at 346; Professional tax practice, 1 J.
Taxation No. 2, 38, at 39 (1954).
51. See Rembar, supra note 1, at 345.
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separate paragraph.52 They argue in addition that if the "provided
further" clause applies to treasury practice then the clause dealing
with interpretation and preparation of legal documents is a nullity.53
The lawyer's position is that the clause refers to practice before
the treasury and that it indicates an abdication by the treasury to
the states of the task of defining what constitutes the practice of
law.5 4 This was the position taken in the Agran case which is the
only decision found on the point.55 The court reasoned that since the
treasury has no authority over the general practice of law the clause
would be a nullity unless it referred to practice before the Treasury
Department.5" The court explained the regulation as being a recog-
nition on the part of the Treasury Department that practice before
it does not in all instances constitute the practice of law and that
the accountants may properly represent their clients when such is
the case.57
There is no question but that the regulation is ambiguous. The
arguments of both sides as to the meaning of the regulations are
plausible. Since the effect of the accountants' position would be that
the accountant could handle any legal question no matter how diffi-
cult irrespective of whether it involved questions of general law,58
it is probable that a result similar to that of the Agran case would be
reached by any other state court.
Proposed Regulations
However, it appears that the dispute as to the meaning of the
regulations will soon be moot. Prior to the Agran decision the
director of practice before the Treasury Department indicated that
Circular 230, which is the basic regulation governing practice before
the Treasury Department, would be revised. Both the legal and
accounting professions have submitted their recommendations. 59
The ABA recommended that no change in substance should be made
in the regulations governing admission to practice.60 The AIA pro-
52. Id. at 346; Professional tax practice, 1 J. Taxation No. 2, 38, at 39(1954).
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d 807, 273 P. 2d 619 (Super. Ct.
1954).
56. Id. at 824, 273 P. 2d at 630.
57. Id. at 825, 273 P. 2d at 630.
58. Ibid. Of course the accountant could not claim the right to draft
legal instruments or give advice on their sufficiency. 31 Code Fed. Regs. §
10.2(f) (1949).
59. Statement of the American Bar Association Regarding Proposed
Revision of Treasury Department Circular No. 230, 40 A. B. A. J. i (Nov.
1954).
"60. Ibid.
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posed that a new provision be added to the regulations which in
effect would require that the "provided further" clause should not
be construed as applying to practice before the Treasury Depart-
ment.01 Since the Agran decision, bills have been introduced in the
House 2 which would authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to
prescribe regulations governing persons who assist taxpayers in
preparing their returns and represent them before the Internal
Revenue Service. The act would provide further "... [t]hat no per-
son shall be denied the right to engage in such activities solely
because he is not a member of any particular profession or calling. '61
The sponsor of the bill has indicated that one of the purposes of the
bill is to establish the fact that control of federal tax practice lies
with Congress and the federal government, and that the intent is to
insure that agents and attorneys will have equal standing in practice
before the treasury." The AIA is supporting the measure. 5
Irrespective of its position on these matters it is clear that the
AIA, which is the national organization of certified public account-
ants, accepts the proposition that in practice before the Treasury
Department, questions may arise which the accountant should not
handle. This is shown by the ratification by the AIA6 of the state-
ment of principals formulated by the National Conference of Certi-
fied Public Accountants and Attorneys which in part provides that
if, in the course of proceedings before the Treasury Department, a
question arises which involves the application of legal principle, a
lawyer should be retained. 67 In view of their recognition of this fact,
it is difficult to understand how the AIA can advocate the acceptance
of their position in regard to the proposed regulations and legisla-
tion which would in effect authorize the accountant to perform the
same services as a lawyer in practice before the treasury and, by
necessary implication,6 to handle all matters prior to appearance
in the Treasury Department.
61. Ibid.
62. Two identical bills have been introduced: H. R. 1601 and 5206, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). A third, similar bill would apply only to persons
assisting taxpayers within the administrative settlement process of the Internal
Revenue Service H. R. 2416, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
63. H. R. 1601, 5206, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
64. 100 Cong. Rec. A5759 (Aug. 4, 1954). Statement made by Repre-
sentative Reed, the author of H. R. 1601, in introducing an identical bill,
H. R. 9922, in the 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1954).
65. Editorial, Federal Control of Federal Tax Practice, 98 J. Account-
ancy 461, 462 (1954).
66. Editorial, Lawyers and CPAs Join in Statement of Principle De-fining Proper Areas of Federal Tax Practice for Members of Both Pro-fessions, 91 J. Accountancy 869 (1951).
67. Id. at 871.
68. Rembar, supra note 1, at 348-349.
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However, it is believed that the real basis of the AIA's position
is not the desire to obtain equal status with lawyers but rather a
sincere belief that what constitutes the practice of law in federal
tax matters should be treated as a federal question,69 and that tax
practice should not be regulated by the courts of 48 different states.7 0
But the problem is not that simple. For any statute or regulation
purporting to put the accountant on an equal basis with the lawyer
in practice before the treasury would be of doubtful constitutional
validity. The problem is whether Congress and/or the Treasury De-
partment have the power to authorize non-lawyers to perform
services that the courts consider to constitute the practice of law
and, if so, would such a regulation preempt the field and exclude
state courts from regulating the matter.
There is a wealth of state court decisions on the question of the
ability of the legislature to regulate the practice of law. The majority
of state courts are in agreement that both the legislature and the
judiciary have the power to prescribe qualifications for admittance
to practice law. 1 The legislature's right arises out of its police
power7 2 and the judiciary's is inherent in the judicial power.7 3 The
state courts agree that the legislature, in the aid of the judiciary, can
fix minimum requirements which will be upheld unless they come
into conflict with those prescriLed by the courts or will prevent the
judiciary from carrying out its proper functions.7 4
However, there is lack of agreement on the question of what type
of legislation constitutes an interference with the proper functions
of the courts. Thus, while recognizing that legislation defining the
practice of law is subject to judicial inquiry as to its propriety and
reasonableness, the California court upheld a statute permitting lay-
men to perform acts which the parties agreed constituted the prac-
69. See Harvard Law Dean Discusses Tax Practice Controversy, 99 3.
Accountancy 31, 32 (Apr. 1955).
70. See Helping the Taxpayer, 98 3. Accountancy 610, 616 (1954).
71. In re Levy, 23 Wash. 2d 607, 161 P. 2d 651 (1945) (by implication);
see Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567, 577 (La. App. 1936) ; It re Bledsoe, 186
Okla. 264, 265, 97 P. 2d 556, 557 (1939) ; Creditors' Service Corporation v.
Cummings, 57 R. I. 291, 300, 190 Atl. 2, 8 (1937) ; It re Cannon, 206 Wis.
374, 397, 240 N. W. 441, 450 (.1932). For a full development of this problem
see Comment, 36 Mich. L. Rev. 82 (1937).
72. Creditors' Service Corporation v. Cummings, 57 R. I. 291, 190 At. 2
(1937) ; see lt re Levy, 23 Wash. 2d 607, 614, 161 P. 2d 651, 654 (1945).
73. E.g., Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N. E. 725 (1932);
see In re Greathouse, 189 Minn. 51, 55, 248 N. W. 735, 737 (1933).
74. In re Kaufman, 69 Idaho 297, 206 P. 2d 528 (1949) ; Meunier v.
Bernich, 170 So. 567 (La. App. 1936) ; In re Levy, 23 Wash. 2d 607, 161 P. 2d
651 (1945) ; see Brydonjack v. State Bar of Cal., 208 Cal. 439, 444, 281 Pac.
1018, 1020( 1929).
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tice of law. 71 One court has even stated by way of dictum that it has
no concern over the practice of law outside of the court room.70
Other courts have just assumed that practice before an administra-
tive agency does not constitute the practice of law.7 7 However, in
cases where the question has been squarely presented, the majority
of state courts have held unconstitutional legislation purporting to
authorize laymen to perform acts which constitute practice of law,
on the grounds that it constitutes an infringement on the power of
the judiciary.78
There are relatively few federal decisions on the question of what
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law, and there are virtually
none on the question of whether Congress or the judiciary has the
ultimate power to determine who may practice law. Article III, § 1
of the Constitution provides that "The judicial Power of the United
States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish."170 Section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which was enacted
pursuant to Article III, § 1, provides that an individual may prose-
cute or defend his own case or, subject to the rules of the several
courts, he may employ another to do so for him.80 In an early case
holding unconstitutional an act of Congress which was designed to
prevent those who had supported the Confederacy from practicing
in Federal Courts, a federal circuit court opined that § 35 of the
Judiciary Act constituted an acknowledgment by Congress that it
was the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the judiciary
should have exclusive control over admissions to the bar.8' In an
earlier decision the Supreme Court recognized that at common
law it was entirely up to the courts to determine which persons
would be admitted to the bar or disbarred, but in the same decision
the court apparently accepted the proposition that the legislature
could prescribe general rules governing admission of attorneys . 2
75. Eagle Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 217 Cal. 244,
18 P. 2d 341 (1933).
76. See It re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 395, 240 N. W. 441, 449 (1932).
77. See Public Service Traffic Bureau, Inc. v. Haworth Marble Co.,
40 Ohio App. 255, 259, 178 N. E. 703, 705 (1931) ; Carr v. Stringer, 171 S. W.
2d 920, 922 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
78. People v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N. E. 2d 941, cert. denied, 302
U. S. 728 (1937) ; Chicago Bar Ass'n v. United Taxpayers of America, 312
Ill. App. 243, 38 N. E. 2d 349 (1941) ; Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567 (La.
App. 1936) ; Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N. E. 313 (1935) ;
accord, In re Kaufman, 69 Idaho 297, 206 P. 2d 528 (1949) ; in re Bledsoe,
186 Okla. 264, 97 P. 2d 556 (1939).
79. U. S. Const. Art. III, § 1.
80. 1 Stat 92 (1789).
81. See In re Shorter, 22 Fed. Cas. 16, 18, No. 12,811 (D. Ala. 1865).
82. See Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13-14 (U.S. 1857).
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The court by way of dictum reaffirmed this proposition in an 1866
decision but failed to state whether rules prescribed by Congress
would be valid if they came into conflict with those prescribed by the
judiciary.83 With the exception of inconsequential dicta in one
district 8 4 and one circuit court"8 case, there have been found no later
federal decisions which have considered the problem.
Since the Supreme Court cases on the matter are all early ones
and not squarely in point, any prediction as to what the Court would
do when confronted with legislation authorizing laymen to perform
acts which under the case law constitute the practice of law would be
pure guesswork. However, it can be pointed out that a decision up-
holding such legislation would constitute a departure from the tenor
of the Court's early decisions and a rejection of the position of the
majority of the state courts.8 6
A statute or regulation authorizing laymen to handle legal
matters before the Treasury Department would also amount to an
authorization to give advice on the same matters independent of
actual appearance before the treasury. Otherwise, the original
authorization would be meaningless.8 7 Thus, assuming that the
federal courts would not treat such a statute or regulation as a
usurpation of the judicial power, we would still have the problem
whether the authorization, by the federal government, of laymen
to perform legal services wou'_d constitute a violation of the rights
of the state in which such services are rendered.
The authority on the question is sparse. The only case found
directly in point involved an attorney who was enrolled before the
Treasury Department and authorized to practice before both the
Tax and Supreme Courts. The attorney sought a determination
from Florida court as to whether he would have to become a mem-
ber of the Florida bar if he confined his practice in Florida to
federal tax matters. The court held that he would, stating that
persons who practice in any field of the law in Florida must be
amenable to regulation by the Florida courts.8 s California8 9 and
Massachusetts 0 courts, without any serious attempt at analysis,
83. See Ex parle Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 379 (U.S. 1867).
84. See Laughlin v. Clephane, 77 F. Supp. 103, 105 (D. D.C. 1947).
85. See Booth v. Fletcher, 101 F. 2d 676, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert.
denied, 307 U. S. 628 (1939).
86. See notes 78, 81 supra, and texts thereto.
87. Rembar, supra note 1, at 348-349.
88. Petition of Kearney, 63 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1953) ; cf. Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Kellogg, 338 Ill. App. 618, 88 N. E. 2d 519 (1st Dist. 1949).
89. See Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d 807, 824, 273 P. 2d 619, 630(Super. Ct. 1954). But cf. In re McCue, 211 Cal. 57, 293 Pac. 47 (1930).
90. See Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 184-185, 52 N. E. 2d
27, 33-34 (1943). But cf. In re Lyon, 301 Mass. 30, 16 N. E. 2d 74 (1938).
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have indicated that they would probably take a similar position.
Balanced against these cases are two decisions, one federal9' and
state, 2 which have upheld contracts to represent clients before,
respectively, the United States Customs Court and the Interstate
Commerce Commission when, under state law, the contracts would
have been void as calling for the unauthorized practice of law. In a
similar case, which involved an attempt by the local bar association
to enjoin certain activities of defendant in federal tax matters, the
District Court for the District of Columbia stated that it had no
power to decide whether the contract called for the unauthorized
practice of law in that federal tax matters do not come before it for
decision. 3 Obviously, if this reasoning is accepted, the state courts
could not regulate the practice of law in the field of federal taxa-
tion. However, the court gave no indication that it had considered
the fact that tax questions often hinge on questions of general law.
There have been no United States Supreme Court decisions on
the problem of the supremacy of federal law over the state laws of
unauthorized practice. But generally the Supreme Court has indi-
cated that under the Supremacy Clause, federal legislation will not
be deemed to have been intended to strike down state police power
measures unless Congress has definitely indicated that such is its
intention.9 4 If the proposed legislation is passed it would be a clear
indication of an intention to override state laws of unauthorized
practice, and in all probability the Supreme Court would so hold.95
Merits of the Question
Actual practice before the treasury is informal and non-adver-
sary. 9 An examining agent contacts the taxpayer when there are
items on the taxpayer's return which he does not understand. If the
items are not explained satisfactorily, the examining agent can
suggest a settlement which must be approved before it becomes
final. 7 If no agreement is reached the taxpayer may have a confer-
91. Brooks v. Mandel-Witte Co., 54 F. 2d 992 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
286 U. S. 559 (1932).92. De Pass v. B. Harris Wool Co., 346 Mo. 1038, 144 S. W. 2d 146(1940).
93. Merrick v. American Security & Trust Co., 22 F. Supp. 177 (D. D.C.1938), aff'd, 107 F. 2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 625 (1940).94. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U. S.
761, 766 (1945). (Such intention may be inferred from obvious conflict of
state and federal law) ; Allen-Bradley Local No. 111 v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 740, 749 (1942).
95. Compare Rembar, supra note 1, at 344, with Griswold, Lawyers,
Accountants, and Taxes, 99 J. Accountancy 33, 40 (1955).
96. Surrey and Warren, Federal Income Taxation, Cases and Materials
49-61 (1954 ed.).
97. Id. at 59.
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ence with the examining agent's superior.O8 If no agreement is
reached here, either the case is dropped or what is known as a thirty
day letter is issued which leaves the taxpayer with the choice of:
(1) filing a formal protest, which is a statement of the taxpayer's
case, requesting that the case be referred to the appellate division
of the taxpayer's region; (2) either requesting, or receiving through
failing to respond to the thirty day letter a deficiency notice or a
ninety day letter, from which an appeal can be taken to the Tax
Court; (3) accepting the group chief's offer of a settlement and
remitting the amount due. 9
The examining agent is an accountant and has relatively little
authority. Fine spun theories of law are wasted on him in that
he must follow departmental rulings and directives.100 Where there
is no danger of a criminal charge, there seems to be no compelling
reason why the accountant should not be able to handle the same
problems in the early stages of negotiation with the Treasury
Department as he may properly perform when preparing a return.
The CPAs agree that the lawyer should be called in when the tax-
payer is being specially investigated for possible criminal viola-
tions. 1 But the problem is that in the early stages of the proceeding
there is no way of determining whether a criminal prosecution will
arise, and consequently there is danger that persons unfamiliar with
rules of evidence might disclose incriminating evidence. The recent
net worth cases are an example of this. In two of the cases taxpayers
represented by accountants were induced to sign net worth state-
mnts containing admissions which were vital to the prosecution's
case. 10 2 The client's best interest requires that whenever there is
any possibility that a criminal investigation might arise a lawyer
should be consulted.
If the accountant is not admitted to practice before the Tax
Court a lawyer should be consulted when the thirty day letter is
issued. For it might be in the taxpayer's best interest that he forego
filing a protest and request that the deficiency notice be issued'03
which would entitle him to file a petition with the Tax Court. 0 4
98. Ibid.
99. Id. at 59-60.
100. See Goodrich and Redman, Procedure Before the Bureau of
Internal Revenue 66 (2d ed. 1953).
101. Statement of Principles Relating to Practice in the Field of Federal
Income Taxation Promulgated by the National Conference of Lawyers and
Certified Public Accountants, 91 J. Accountancy 869, 871 (1951).
102. See Smith v. United States, 348 U. S. 147 (1954) ; United States
v. Calderon, 348 U. S. 160 (1954).
103. Goodrich and Redman, op. cit. supra note 100, at 87-91.
104. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 6213 (a).
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If the accountant is not admitted to practice before the Tax Court,
which is true of most accountants, 10 he could not file the petition
and this fact might have the effect of influencing his decision as to
whether the better strategy would be to file a protest or to turn the
case over to a lawyer who could petition to the Tax Court.
Even if the accountant is admitted to practice before the Tax
Court, a lawyer should be consulted when the deficiency notice
is issued, for at this point a choice of remedies is available to the
taxpayer. He may either petition the Tax Court or pay the alleged
deficiency and sue in district court or the court of claims for a re-
fund.100 The non-lawyer may not appear before either the district
court or the court of claims. There is danger that this fact might
influence his judgment. In addition the choice involves questions
of strategy that only the lawyer should decide. For example, one
of the questions that must be answered is whether the taxpayer
would fare better before a jury or the Tax Court. Certified public
accountants agree that the decision on the choice of remedies should
be made by a lawyer, but they do not accept the proposition that this
fact should preclude the CPA from being admitted to practice before
the Tax Court.1 0
7
PRACTICE BEFORE THE TAX COURT
Prior to 1942 CPAs and lawyers were admitted to practice be-
fore the Tax Court by proof of their status as such, but since 1942
the Tax Court has required the layman to pass a written examina-
tion before being admitted to practice. 0 8 From 1942 to 1947 only 93
took the examination and only 12 were enrolled.10 During 1953,
non-lawyers tried only 7 cases before the Ta: Court. 1-0 However,
prior to 1942 7,000 laymen had been admitted to practice before
the Tax Court.""' Technically the Tax Court is an administrative
agency,"x2 but it is generally recognized that proceedings before it
are judicial in nature."13 The taxpayer's petition must set forth
assignments of error and the facts supporting them."-4 The issues
105. See notes 108, 109 infra, and texts thereto.
106. Goodrich and Redman, op. cit. supra note 100, at 112-114.
107. Statement of Principles Relating to Practice in the Field of
Federal Income Taxation Proinulated by the National Conference of Lawyers
and Certified Public Accountants, 91 J. Accountancy 869, 871 (1951).
108. 26 Code Fed. Regs. § 701.2(d) (Cum. Supp. 1953) ; Carey, supra
note 7, at 449.
109. Otterbourg, supra note 38, at 11.
110. Helping the Taxpayer, 98 J. Accountancy 610, 615 (1954).
111. Otterbourg, supra note 38, at 11.
112. See Davis, Administrative Law § 1 n. 1 (1951).
113. See Stem v. CIR, 215 F. 2d 701, 706-708 (3d Cir. 1954).
114. 26 Code Fed. Regs. 701.7(c) (4) (iv), (v) (1949).
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are limited. to matters raised through the petition. Thus, in effect
the petition constitutes a pleading.1 15 The proceedings are conducted
in an adversary manner, and the rules of evidence are followed. 110
The presiding judge of the Tax Court in testifying before a con-
gressional committee has stated that 75 to 95 per cent of the cases
heard and decided in the Tax Court turn upon presentation of
evidence or upon principles of general law, and that accountants
appearing before the Tax Court cannot adequately present evidence
and often slip up on even elementary questions of general law.11 7
In view of the nature of its proceedings, it is difficult to under-
stand how the accountants can contend that they should be allowed
to practice before the Tax Court. The answer is probably that they
do not actually wish to try cases before the Tax Court but simply
wish to have the right to file a petition as an aid in the settlement
of cases with the Service."" Since the petition is a pleading which
restricts the issues it is doubtful that the accountant should even
be allowed to file it.
CoNrCLUSION
It is clear that the analysis and interpretation of conflicting case
law constitutes an exercise in legal thinking. The only area of tax
practice in which the accountant can claim a right to perform these
functions is where the problems involved is one that hinges on
accounting concepts. With some validity, the accountant can argue
that the average legal practitioner is not conversant with account-
ing concepts and therefore is not competent to handle problems of
this type. On the other hand, lawyers can argue that accountants
are not trained in legal methods and therefore are not competent to
analyze and interpret cases. Undoubtedly, there are members of
both professions that are capable of handling such problems, but
under existing conditions there is no way to determine who these
individuals are. This being so, the safe solution is to require that
accountants and lawyers cooperate in handling this type of problem.
However, such a requirement is unworkable unless both professions
recognize the need for cooperation. As evidenced by their dis-
approval of the Conway and Agran cases, it is apparent that the
CPAs do not recognize this need.
115. See American Bar Asso.iation Committee on Unauthorizcd Prac-
tice of Law States Its Position with Reference to Practice of Law by Ac-
countants, 14 Unauth. Prac. News, No. 3, 11, at 12 (1948).
116. 26 Code Fed. Regs. § 701.31(a) (1949).
117. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee on H. R. 3214, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1948).
118. See Austin, mtpra note 2, at 239; Correa, supra note 7, at 606;
Helping the Taxpayer, 98 J. Accountancy 610, 615 (1954).
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However, the legal profession is not blameless. Elements of it
have steadfastly refused to recognize that status as a lawyer does not
necessarily insure that an individual is competent to handle tax
matters. The profession has concentrated on "protecting" the public
from the accountant but not from its own members. It has been
suggested that a treasury bar be established which would be com-
posed of accountants who have demonstrated competence to handle
legal matters and lawyers who have demonstrated an understanding
of accounting concepts.110 This approach is at best a partial solu-
tion 20 and of doubtful constitutional validity. Nonetheless it is a
step in the right direction. For any solution of the problem must
reflect the fact that status as an accountant or a lawyer does not
insure that a particular individual is competent to handle all prob-
lems arising in the field of taxation.
119. Rembar, supra note 1, at 352-353.
120. The Lawyer-A ccountant Conflict, 97 J. Accountancy 545, 546-547
(1954).
